This article examines the main argument made by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his treatise al-Risāla al-ma'mūla fī al-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq.
I n the Islamic intellectual tradition, al-Fārābī was the first scholar to express the formulation of knowledge by dividing it into conception and assent to solve Meno's Paradox. 1 Even though he specified which parts of logic were to be placed under each of these categories, he did not reorganize the science of logic as a whole in terms of this division. After al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā took up this divison, applied it to logic in its entirety, and gave classical logic its present form. Following the dissemination of his works on logic, the arguments over what exactly he meant by conception and assent, which Islamic thought held to be the principal parts of logic, started to take place. Particularly in the post-Ghazālian period, with the theologians inheriting and appropriating Ibn Sīnā's works, intense disputes arose over this specific division and how conception and assent were to be defined. They expressed their ideas more in terms of the division of the various parts of knowledge and critically evaluated the previous ideas in a manner proportionate to the size of the work in question. In this sense, this discussion revolves around how conception and assent are related to and differentiated from each other, and thus it actually appears as an explication consisting of two principal statements. However, a more thorough examination reveals that this matter is actually related to how the definition of knowledge in the philosophical and theological traditions is to be understood, or, stated otherwise, what the essence of knowledge actually is. The first separate work on the conception-assent division is Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's treatise al-Risāla al-ma'mūla fī al-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq. As will be explained below, basing his views in particular on Shahāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī's expositions, he transforms the debate over the true nature of knowledge and its various parts into a basis for several foundational claims regarding the proposition-assent relation, or that between language and logic, by exposing the epistemological foundations of the debate on the conception-assent division.
A number of studies on this latter division have been conducted, and the various positions within the Islamic intellectual tradition have already been outlined. 3 Besides these, J. Lameer has carried out separate studies on al-Abharī, one of the sources of the debate carried out by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his al-Risāla al-ma'mūla, and on Mullā Ṣadrā, who deals with this division by problematizing anew the sources and assessments of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī. 4 Sümeyye Parıldar has examined the relation between the views of Mullā Ṣadrā on ontology and the two-fold division of conception and assent. 5 Moreover, in his article dealing with the parts of the proposition, Khaled el-Rouayheb has examined in great depth Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's notion of the proposition with reference to the literature of commentaries and glosses on Kātibī's al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya. 6 However, the content of al-Risāla al-ma'mūla has not been thoroughly analysed as of yet. In addition, its claims have not been discussed and its impact on the Islamic intellectual tradition has not been traced.
This article will first summarize Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's views in this treatise, and thereafter, by assessing the treatise's true purpose and considering his definition of assent, will argue that al-Rāzī held that knowledge is, in fact, assent itself. Since several existing studies provide general knowledge about the conception-assent division, a detailed account of it will not be presented here; rather, definitions of assent will be pointed out to the extent that he dealt with them in his treatise while formulating a basis for his views.
One can trace the results of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's view on assent, through the commentarial literature of glosses (ḥāshiya) and annotated works (ta'līq) written on his Lawāmi ' al-asrār and Taḥrīr al-qawā'id al-manṭiqiyya fī al-Risālat al-Shamsiyya. It can be said that el-Rouayheb partially addresses this issue in his above-mentioned study. Similarly, one can consider Lameer's study on Mullā Ṣadrā as effectively dealing with how Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's view affected the notion of assent. However, this article specifically points out the theoretical results of his definition of assent without examining his impact on the history of logic.
I
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's views in the aforementioned treatise can be summarized via the following thesis statements: (i) the category of knowledge is quality, (ii) knowledge is not form but obtainment (ḥuṣūl), and (iii) knowledge is, in fact, assent itself.
The first two theses are critical, for they provide the basis for his positions. The issue concerning which category knowledge belongs to became a lively point of discussion with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's criticisms directed against Ibn Sīnā. For example, he claims that Ibn Sīnā is steeped in confusion with regards to which category knowledge should belong to, since he considers it to belong to quality in some instances, to relation in others, and to action in yet other cases. 7 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī contends that knowledge belongs to relation. 8 Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī simply places knowledge within the category of quality without participating in any of the debates over its categorization. 9 Nevertheless, he draws particular attention to its category for two reasons: (i) to limit the discussion to obtained (ḥuṣūlī) knowledge by pointing out that the conception-assent division has no relation to a priori (ḥuḍūrī) knowledge and (ii) to draw attention to the fact that the soul (nafs) is in a passive state (munfa'il) during the formation of obtained knowledge. As it is in this state during the acquisition of obtained knowledge, cognizance of what is known occurs as a quality in the soul. Therefore, the definitions of conception and assent must be disregarded aforehand if they neglect this reality. As will be indicated below, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī disregards some definitions of assent, thereby implying or taking as their basis the notion that the soul is in an active state during the process of knowing or obtaining knowledge.
His thesis that "knowledge is not form but obtainment" reveals his preference for the well-known philosophical definition that "knowledge is the obtainment of the form of a thing in the soul". In this respect, knowledge is not primarily a state of nonexistence or removal, but rather a state of existence and acquisition (taḥṣīl). There is something (amr) in the soul that overlaps and is unique to every known thing, and this amr is completely distinct from any other amr that corresponds to any other known thing. In this sense, knowledge contains all beliefs about matters, regardless of whether it agrees with things as they are in themselves (nafs al-amr) or includes a definitive decision (jazm). Therefore, all instances of conception and assent are contained within the purview of knowledge. 10
What is important in this explanation is that Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī considers knowledge to be obtainment itself, and not the form that comes about in the mind. In fact, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī and other scholars claim that defining knowledge as "the form's obtainment in the mind" is actually rather loose and thus not strict enough, for what is really meant here is "the form that occurs in the mind". 11 According to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, that particular form is not knowledge, but it is known through this knowledge. In other words, knowledge is solely the occurrence of this form. Therefore, he consciously uses amr rather than form to point out the distinctiveness of knowledge as it relates to things that are known. In fact, amr does not have to be an object, an incident, or a form, since mere occurrence or acknowledgment itself is also an amr. In the most general sense, this term indicates anything that is ascertained. In this respect, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī defines knowledge as the mind's acknowledgement of the forms present in it as mere belief, or as belief in accordance with things as they are in themselves.
The third thesis, "knowledge is in fact assent itself", in contrast to the first two, is not explicitly stated in the treatise. However, in my opinion Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's main assertion and the main purpose of his treatise is the thesis that knowledge is, in fact, assent. All of the treatise's discussions begin to make sense once they are interpreted according to this thesis. At first glance, such a conclusion may be held to be in contrast with the import of the text itself and an excessively eisegetical reading of it. For this reason, its content will be summarized below, and then the conclusions regarding the definition of assent, both those mentioned by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī himself and those not explicitly indicated by him, will be treated in sequence.
II
Essentially, conception has two definitions: (i) the obtainment of the form of a thing, and (ii) solely the obtainment of the form of a thing form without regard to anything else. Within the second definition, both "the absence of a judgement made being taken into consideration" and the notion of "a judgement's presence not having been taken into consideration" can be understood. Accordingly, in the second definition, conception may be explained as "solely the obtainment of form by taking into account the non-existence of any judgement made" or "solely the obtainment of form without taking into account the existence of a judgement". 12 Assent, the main issue of the treatise, is subjected to four definitions:
(i) Assent is judgement. As Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī highlighted, the post-Rāzīan logicians have attributed this view to the logicians preceding Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (qudamā'). However, he states that the aforementioned judgement in the definition can have three meanings: intisāb, nisba, and ta'aqqul. While the first is the relationality (intisāb) of one thing to another, be it affirmative or negative, the second is the relation itself (nisba). The last of these is the apprehension of the soul (ta'aqqul) as to whether or not the relation has become actualized. (iv) Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's own view: Assent is the conscious volitional affirmation of the truth of something and the acceptance of and submission to this truth (iqrār and idh'ān) that occurs in the soul with respect to the meaning of a proposition. 13 In this treatise, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī advocates the fourth definition. According to him, the meaning of the iqrār or idh'ān in question differs from that of the obtainment (ḥuṣūl) of a proposition's meaning in the soul and comes about together with the proposition's meaning. To put it more explicitly, assent is the affirmation of a proposition's overlapping with reality when this proposition's meaning forms in the mind. He refers to this affirmation as the form of acceptance and submission (ṣūrat al-idh'ān). The propositional meaning could be affirmative or negative.
The form of the affirmation is the state of the approval of the proposition's content, be this done affirmatively or negatively. However, in this sense, it is possible for idh'ān to both correspond and not to correspond with things as they are (nafs al-amr). Therefore, assent is the belief of correspondence, which neither transforms its content nor what is believed into actually corresponding with reality. In this way, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī thinks he has attained a definition of assent that is valid for all five of the arts, namely, logical demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric, sophistry, and poetics.
Theories of assent must describe the process of entifying the form of assent in detail. Proceeding with the example he uses -in the proposition "The universe is created" -once the mind establishes the link between the universe and the notion of being created, then a relation (nisba) between them is established and the relationality (intisāb) between them becomes actualized. Here, the relation and relationality differ from each other, for the first is an act of the mind and is dependent upon its will, whereas the second is the state of being related between the subject and predicate that is actualized once such a relation is established. Judgement is delivered when these two are connected together, due to the appearance of the proposition "The universe is created". However, assent is still not present because it appears only when the mind is satisfied with the fact that the universe is created, as opposed to when it establishes a relation of the notion of being created to the universe. Therefore, assent does not mean to connect two notions together, but to believe that the notions connected together are actually connected together with regards to existence itself or things as they are in themselves. In this case, as the mind links the concept of the universe and the notion of being created by bringing them together, the relationality between them is actualized and the mind establishes a relation between them. Therefore, judgement is the mind's establishment of this relation.
As a consequence, judgement differs from this relationality (intisāb), for when the connection between them is established, the relation (nisba) established, which is an act of the mind, and the aforementioned connection become distinct from each other. Whereas the connection itself corresponds to relationality, the relation established by the mind corresponds to judgement. Since the relationality between the universe and the notion of being created is not judgement itself, it must be something different from the totality of these parts.
On the other hand, assent takes place only if one believes, after the formation of relationality and the relation, that this corresponds with reality. If one doubts or does not believe this to be the case, even though there is relationality and judgement, then there is no assent. Hence, assent differs from judgement in terms of the relation between the subject and the predicate. Assent is the state of acceptance and conviction of the mind regarding the judgement when the subject and predicate, the relationality between them, and the relation are all present. While judgement is an act of the soul and thus belongs to the category of action, assent is something that belongs to the category of passion. The key point here is that relationality, the relation, and judgement may occur without requiring any conscious volitional affirmation or acceptance (iqrār or idh'ān) of the truth of something.
In such a situation, conception comprises the subject, the predicate, the relationality of these two, the judgement between them that is actualized by the soul, and the form of the composite consisting of all of these. If this same composite's obtainment occurs in a manner that corresponds to things in themselves as they are, then in terms of the obtainment of this composite, this is also regarded as conception. It is, however, regarded as assent in terms of acceptance of the subject matter that is under consideration for the judgement made. To give an example, the meaning of the universe, the meaning of being created, the relationality between these two, the relation established by the mind between the two meanings, and the form of the composite formulated by the proposition "The universe is created" together constitute conception. Assent is the mind's being convinced that the universe is, in fact, created.
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī draws an interesting conclusion from this: It is solely and exclusively the judgement assented to that becomes the subject of assent. Assent absolutely requires judgement, but not vice versa. If a judgement is doubted or rejected, then it can only continue to be described as conception, since conscious volitional affirmation or acceptance (iqrār or idh'ān) of the truth of something does not occur, and the judgement made remains only as conception, independent of whether the proposition is affirmative or negative. That is, if a proposition, which may be either affirmative or negative, is affirmed to be true or believed to correspond with reality, then assent occurs; otherwise in all cases it remains as conception. For instance, when the mind confirms the judgement involved in the proposition "The universe is created" or the judgement in the proposition "The universe is not created", then assent takes place. Assent, therefore, is independent of whether the proposition is affirmative or negative and refers only to the belief that a judgement corresponds with extramental reality. Thus, the same proposition may be subjected to states of assent, denial, and doubt by different individuals. 14
III
This view leads to a number of important conclusions, some of which Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī himself expresses. However, some of the ones that he does not mention are actually more revolutionary. To begin with, these may be listed sequentially.
(i) The correspondence included in a belief is one part of assent. However, since one's belief in this correspondence does not necessarily mean that it is in fact the case, correspondence to reality is not part of assent, although in some cases it is required. Seen from this standpoint, assent immediately comes either with all of conception or with some instances of conception. But conception can be a notion, a specified composite, or a proposition, and thus a word or a meaning's being a proposition does not prevent it from being an instance of conception. Yet it is very rare to find an instance of conception without assent, for every conception, be it simple or compound, is necessarily established with regard to its correspondence with reality. 15 In this respect, the subject, the predicate, and the judgement made are only conditions of assent, not its parts. 16 (ii) In the first place, all knowledge is conception, and assent is only an instance of its cognizance which is attached to it. Accordingly, knowledge is divided into two parts: conception without assent and conception accompanied by assent. In other words, all knowledge is conception, but assent takes place only in some cases. Furthermore, assent is also considered as conception in terms of its obtainment (ḥuṣūl) in the mind, and is considered as assent only in regards to its acknowledgement of that which is assented to. When the correspondence of any conception to reality is taken into consideration, that conception cannot remain as conception only; rather, it transforms into conception accompanied by assent. 17 (iii) Although we divide knowledge into conception and assent, the former is not, in fact, the counterpart (qasīm) of the latter; rather, as mentioned above, assent also is conception in terms of its formation in the mind. To explain the conceptionassent relation and by having recourse to the relation between accidental occurrence ('āriḍ) and accidental affection (ma'rūḍ), Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī considers conception and assent as accidental occurrence and accidental affection, respectively. Nevertheless, he also indicates that conception is the first occurrence of knowledge by emphasizing that this comparison is only metaphorical. Accordingly, assent does not take place without the occurrence of conception, because it is the first occurrence of knowledge.
He indicates yet another important conclusion with his account of accidental occurrence-accidental affection ('āriḍ-ma'rūḍ): Even if assent were to be brought about with all instances of conception, all conception that stands in such a relation with assent cannot itself become assent; rather, it remains only as conception accompanied by assent. Due to the fact that the difference between conception and assent is categorical, conception does not become assent and assent does not Ibid., 113-14. 18 Ibid., 115.
division and the consequences derived from these evaluations were previously stated by Suhrawardī in his Talwīhāt and Muṭāraḥāt.
He does not consider definitions of assent in the manner expressed by al-Suhrawardī, claiming that "[Assent] is to judge one thing to be another", to be correct, thinking that such definitions are too loose and not strict enough. According to him, even though this definition can be applied to categorical propositions, it cannot be applied to hypothetical ones because assent means to give affirmative or negative judgements on instances of conception. On this basis, he draws the following conclusions: (i) Assent is not identical to the proposition; rather, it is the judgement rendered itself. But such a judgement only becomes actualized when it is applied to conception; (ii) Judgement is an act, yet this act's cognizance is not itself an act. Therefore, while judgement as an act is assent, its cognizance is an instance of conception. For this reason, all of our knowledge is conception; and (iii) In some instances, these instances of conception turn into assent, which consists of affirmation or negation of the relation (nisba). As a consequence, al-Suhrawardī thinks that Ibn Sīnā's classification of knowledge, namely, "Knowledge is either mere conception or it is conception accompanied by assent," is the most cautious one. 19
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī considers the explanation of judgement as the definitive determination of the relation to be similar in meaning to the conscious volitional acceptance of the truth of something (idh'ān), acknowledgement (i'tirāf), and definitive decision (jazm). He accomplishes this by benefiting from the ideas of Ibn Kammūna, a commentator of the Talwīhāt who also elucidates the above-mentioned issues, stating that while judgement is conception in terms of its occurrence in the mind, "its feature of being a judgement is assent", and declaring further that such an explanation includes both categorical and hypothetical propositions of assent. Assessing the nature of relationality and its appearance, along with the states of human acceptance, Ibn Kammūna concludes that judgement and assent are different, yet nevertheless they require each other and thus are predicated of each other. 20 On the other hand, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī thinks that the existence of 19 Ibid., 118-21. assent requires the existence of judgement; however, he thinks the reverse is not true and thus rejects any mutual relation of necessity. However, he must have been convinced that Ibn Kammūna came to the conclusion of idh'ān and treated the issue in its proper context, regardless of the extent to which he claimed that there is a mutual relation of necessity between assent and judgement. 21
The problem with the second definition of assent (i.e., "the totality of the parts of the proposition") attributed to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī now becomes clear with the elucidations provided above, for if assent is "the totality of the parts of the proposition", then it can be accompanied by doubt, denial, and acceptance. However, according to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, assent cannot coincide with doubt and denial. 22 As mentioned above, he considers that the subject and predicate, the relation (nisba), and judgement are not parts, but rather conditions, of assent. Nevertheless, there are some implications and conclusions of his conceptionassent theory that he does not mention in the treatise. One can summarize them as follows:
(i) As mentioned at the beginning, according to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī the definiton of knowledge emphasizes obtainment (ḥuṣūl), and the form itself is that which is known. In this case, "knowledge" is not the meanings themselves represented in the mind, but rather the cognizance and awareness of them. Stated otherwise, obtained knowledge consists of the beliefs about meanings represented in the soul itself. If these beliefs include a second cognizance or belief regarding their correspondence with extramental reality, besides being instances of conception they also include assent. Hence, there is a three-phased state of being with regards to knowledge: form, conception as the first knowledge, and assent as the second knowledge.
As will be recalled from discussions on mental existence, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī considers the forms in the mind to be representations of objects in extramental reality. From this perspective, a thing's essence exists only in itself in extramental reality, whereas the form in the mind is the representation and shadow of that essence. Nevertheless, this respresentation represents the essence actualized in the object itself and takes its place. Here these forms are the things that the mind knows directly and, through them, the objects of extramental reality. As such, knowledge is a belief related to the forms in the mind, and when combined with the second belief regarding the form's correspondence with extramental reality, this second belief is called "assent."
The belief in the correspondence with extramental reality is more open to change than the first belief, which is directly associated with the form in the mind, because according to the Peripatetic tradition, the first belief may rely on a cause, on commonly accepted premises, or on a source of authority, and continues to exist depending upon the strength or permanence of these reasons. The form in the mind is undoubtedly open to change, but as long as it exists, there is no impediment to this first belief, or in other words, to maintaining the existence of the conception of knowledge related to the form. This conclusion, which can be interpreted as a critique of the view that knowledge is form, also represents a peculiar aspect manifested within the discussions on mental existence. This is the notion that form is not knowledge, because the form in the mind is the representation (mithāl) of the essence that is actualized in extramental reality, an opinon that Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī shares with Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī.
However, according to al-Rāzī, this form is not, in fact, knowledge but the thing known. In this respect, knowledge is not conducive to being considered in the context of the identity of the form in the mind and the form actualized in extramental reality. In other words, the correct word to use for the relation between knowledge and the known is not identity but overlap. Just as a painting of something corresponds directly with that which is painted, the form in the mind may overlap with the form of things as they are in themselves (nafs al-amr) or that of extramental reality, in which case the belief appearing in the mind, which is related to the overlapping form, is knowledge. What makes this possible is the overlap of the form in the mind with the form of things as they are in themselves (nafs al-amr) or with that of extramental reality. 24 (ii) The purpose of the philosophical sciences is to comprehend the reality of existent entities that have come into existence, whether by means of human volition or in a manner independent of it. Given that their purpose is to reveal the correspondence of the form in the mind to extramental reality, or to things as they are in themselves, knowledge of reality is in fact assent, not conception. Conception stands as a necessary threshold only in terms of providing a basis for assent.
Beliefs that remain at the level of conception and do not give rise to a second belief involving correspondence with things as they are in themselves are not conducive to being counted as the knowledge of a knowing subject, even if by definition these beliefs are knowledge. This is so because when there is no belief regarding the correspondence of the first belief to things as they are in themselves, there can be no belief regarding what is corresponded to by the form in the mind. Beliefs regarding the belief of correspondence of the forms in the mind to extramental reality are not equivalent to each other, for assent occurs only if this second belief regarding the correspondence of the belief in the mind to actual existence takes place.
Differences among the instances of assent are actualized through a third set of beliefs that are attached to these second beliefs, for these third beliefs may relate to the instances of assent as being certain (yaqīnī), in a state similar to that of certainty, or persuasive or speculative. The first type of assent includes the belief that no change is possible in the condition of that which is assented to in extramental reality, and therefore, there is a belief that it is impossible for this first belief to change. In the case of the second type of assent, being in a state that is similar to being certain, while it is not believed that what is contradictory to the belief is possible, it is nevertheless possible to cast doubt on this belief. In regards to the third type of assent, that of persuasive and speculative assent, there occurs a second belief that the contradictory of the first belief is possible.
These three types of assent correspond to the philosphers' division of logical demonstration, dialectics, and rhetoric. 25 Attached as they are to assent, these beliefs form a second set of beliefs within the category of assent, yet they occupy fourth place in terms of the levels of belief in the mind. In such circumstances, when assent takes place, it has a four-layered formation: (a) the form, (b) the belief qua conception, (c) the second belief of the correspondence of the first belief to things as they are in themselves, and (d) the third belief regarding whether this correspondence is certain, similar to being certain, or speculative. The third belief (d) in the series comes with the second belief (c), which, in turn, comes with the first belief (b).
Therefore, at first glance, when the belief forming the justification for acceptance is taken into account, it would seem that assent must be a two-layered belief in itself. The first layer is the conviction that the belief, in its condition of being a conception, corresponds to extramental reality; the second layer is the determination that this conviction may or may not be otherwise. When examined more closely, however, it becomes clear that the justifying belief is not part of assent; in fact, it is not even an instance of assent, but rather an instance of conception, because the justification-assent relation is established entirely by the mind.
We can shed greater light on the matter through an example. Let us presume that a person has the assent that "The universe is created". Here, the proposition's subject (the universe) and predicate (created) are instances of conception. Because the mind connects the concepts of the universe and being created together, relationality (intisāb) between these two has formed and been established. When the mind associates the predicate of being created to the universe, it reaches judgement.
As mentioned above, all of these are instances of conception. Thereafter, when one accepts that this is in fact the case, then the judgement has been assented to. There could be different reasons for such an assent taking place, such as the notion that the majority of humanity thinks in this way, that great thinkers or prophets have said that this is so, or that the universe is subjected to change and things subjected to change cannot exist on their own -all of these may be accepted as justifications. All of these cases actually consist of separate instances of conception and assent.
To accept that most people consider the universe as something created is a new instance of assent. Accepting that great thinkers or prophets declare the universe to be created is also a new instance of assent. Likewise, believing that the universe is created because it is subjected to change is yet another new instance of assent. All of these instances of assent and the preceding judgement have a correspondence, and assent takes place after one accepts this correspondence. Yet there is no extramental correspondence of the relation between these instances of assent, which stand as justifications, and the assent that the universe is created; this relation is established by the mind itself. Therefore, the belief of the relation between the first assent and the second assent which was made a justification for the first one is a conception established by the mind.
The connection that can be formed between the assent that the universe is created and the instances of assent that justify the association of the notion of being created to the universe, due to its being formed only within the mind itself, is the relationality (intisāb) of these instances of assent. When the mind establishes a relation (nisba) that allows this relationality to be established, it means that judgement has been rendered. When it accepts this judgement, it reaches the level of assent; however, this assent does not correspond extramentally, but only within the mind. Thus, even though this assent is not in correspondence with extramental reality, one can speak of its correspondence with things as they are in themselves (nafs al-amr), which is not limited to extramental reality. In such circumstances, instances of assent such as "believing that A is B" and "believing that it is impossible, or the like thereof, for A not to be B" are not just independent of each other, but their conditions of truth also differ from each other.
(iii) The above assessments make it easier to understand why theologians of the early classical period defined knowledge by taking assent fully into account, and also demonstrate the commonality between the theologians' and philosophers' definitions of knowledge. As is well-known, knowledge is considered to be either a belief or an attribute, especially in the views of the earlier classical period theologians. Mu'tazilite thinkers consider divine knowledge to be identical with the divine entity, wheras human knowledge is actualized as a belief. In this context, the Mu'tazilites provided three well-known definitions of knowledge: (a) Ka'bī's "Knowledge is to believe something as it is ‫به(‬ ‫هو‬ ‫ما‬ ‫عىل‬ ‫اليشء‬ ‫,")اعتقاد‬ 26 (b) Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī's "Knowledge is to believe something as it is in the way it is due to a necessary requirement or proof ‫دليل(‬ ‫أو‬ ‫برضورة‬ ‫به‬ ‫هو‬ ‫ما‬ ‫عىل‬ ‫اليشء‬ ‫,")اعتقاد‬ 27 and (c) Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī's "[It is] the belief regarding which peace descends upon the soul with respect to the notion that something is in fact the way it is." 28 Although these explanations contain some differences of detail, they are essentially in line with the philosophers' views that divine self-knowledge is identical with the divine essence and that knowledge is a belief that corresponds with things as they are in themselves. Philosophers contend that knowledge is identical to the self with regards to God and the celestial intelligences. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the theory of the soul entails the notion that human knowledge must transform into a cognizance that, in the final analysis, is identical to the self. Yet for now, this is a difference of detail, and the Peripatetics and Mu'tazilites generally agree that knowledge is belief, since knowledge, according to both traditions, is human knowledge about things when it becomes assent in the manner stated by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī.
If this were not the case, it would remain merely at the level of cognizance of the forms in the mind. In this sense, there is no difference between the definition and the syllogism, for both are instances of conception in terms of their being in the mind and may accompany a belief that has a relation of correspondence with things as they are in themselves.
In fact, Sunni theologians pursue the same goal with regards to knowledge, even though they claim that it is an attribute and not a belief. Indeed, Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, who evaluates the various definitions of knowledge in al-Mawāqif, regards the following one as the most appropriate: "Knowledge is an attribute that necessitates resolving meanings in a manner that makes it impossible for there to be any contradiction". 29 Koloğlu, Cübbâîlerin Kelam Sistemi (Istanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2011), 131-36. 29 al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, 1:170. 30 Ibid., 1:176. attribute; however, the definitions' main emphasis in our context is that knowledge involves resolving and illuminating.
Both scholars, with great precision, preferred to employ statements formulated in such a manner as to include conception in the definition of knowledge. However, this demonstrates the careful sensitivity shown by post-classical theologians who inherited the logic of Ibn Sīnā, since the definitions of knowledge devised by the Sunni theologians of the earlier classical period were based on the notion of assent. 31 Expressions such as "resolving meanings" and "illuminating what was said" in the definitions preferred by al-Ījī and al-Jurjānī emphazise the cognizance of reality by the cognizing subject. For this reason, whether we call it attribute or belief, what is essential with regards to knowledge is the cognizing subject's possession of a belief in which he/she thinks of correspondence with the object of cognition. Thus, knowledge in the Sunni tradition is essentially assent.
(iv) In terms of the philosophers' search for the truth, the instances of conception obtained through this research program are instances of conception of its object, because the theory of definition in logic seeks to determine the object's constituent (dhātī) features. Consequently, the conception that relates to the object under consideration necessarily includes assent, for such an instance of conception seeks to be one that corresponds with the object. In this sense, all processes involved in research, such as determining existence, naming, determining constituent elements, and predicating its states ineluctably require the instances of assent that are attached to the belief in the form of conception, for without the belief of correspondence the whole process becomes meaningless. As such, just as Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī stated, conception without assent is rare, and when it comes to the genuine sciences, all such instances of conception are surrounded by clusters of instances of assent that are related to the object of that conception. In this respect, knowledge is conception only in terms of being simple or compound meanings in the mind. Nevertheless, almost every instance of conception is together with assent, since each such instance of conception must belong to some object or thing. Furthermore, conception gains scientific value as long as it is a conception of something.
As such, scientific data, be it in the form of a concept or a proposition, must all be immediately considered as instances of assent; however, as a subject of education, it turns completely into conception and becomes assent only if it becomes something approved by the knowing subject. This means that assent itself is not something that can be transferred and taught. It can be subjected to teaching only when it is thought about and expressed in the form of a concept or a proposition or, in other words, only when it is turned into conception, according to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī. In this case, assent is spoken of by considering some of the instances of conception as its sign.
The statement that "the subject matter of logic is objects of conception and assent" should be interpreted in this context; stated otherwise, logic is actually just a study of the conditions of conception. Logic examines the properties of meanings and relations between them and the simple and specified composites under the heading of conception, all the while examining the propositions or syllogisms consisting of them under the heading of assent, which also consists of conception in terms of its appearance in the mind. Hence, formal examination in logic cannot go beyond the study of conception. Nevertheless, propositions take the place of instances of assent when one supposes that they are assented to, and the study of logic is carried out based on this supposition.
(v) When one lacks the belief in correspondence, the condition of all the meanings as concepts, compounds, or propositions being instances of conception raises an imporant question: What is the source of conception or, put another way, under which conditions can someone attach assent to conceptions? Assent is obviously not something verbal. In addition, the above-mentioned explanations reveal that assent is not related to the form in which the meaning lies, for it is asserted that propositions are instances of conception even though they seem to be instances of assent.
In such circumstances, what is the source of the assent of the cognizing subject regarding any meaning? It appears that the source of assent, as stated in the five arts, is either a priori knowledge, knowledge of causes, being well-known, or submission to a source of authority. If the matter is examined closely, none of these is a formal part of the syllogism. Assent, then, is not something provided and assured by definition or syllogism. Rather, logic serves to provide coherence in thought and determines the conditions for ways of thinking based on a priori knowledge, a cause, being well-known, or submission to a source of authority.
Conclusion
Clearly, the conception-assent division benefits perfecting the structure of the discipline of logic and making research systematic, and also constitutes the basis of a meticulous discussion regarding the essence of knowledge. Yet the question of what contribution it provides to logic as a method needs to be discussed in greater detail. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī delves deeply into this issue in his Lawāmi ' al-asrār, Risāla fī al-kulliyyāt, and al-Risāla al-ma'mūla fī al-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq . It could be said that the overriding motive behind his interest in the discussions undertaken by thinkers of the post-Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī period is specifically to revise their interpretations of Ibn Sīnā.
One can observe this endeavour in the entire corpus of his philosophical works, as well as in his works on logic in particular. Believing that Ibn Sīnā's works have been misinterpreted with regards to the conception-assent division, he attempts to explain this division correctly. He treats the subject quite briefly in Lawāmi' al-asrār and refers to al-Risālat al-ma'mūla for detailed discussions of this matter. Yet he only indicates the issue in the work al-Muḥākamāt and discusses the problem of mental existence in line with the premise that knowledge is form. 32 Consequently, the precision in al-Risāla al-ma'mūla regarding the conception-assent division is absent.
He examines the matter in Ṭaḥrīr qawā'id al-manṭiqiyya fī sharḥ al-Shamsiyya thoroughly and very precisely, considering the size of the work, 33 yet it still lacks the purpose set out in al-Risāla al-ma'mūla and the subtlety of interpretation based on the notion of idh'ān. 34 For this reason, al-Risāla al-ma'mūla occupies an exceptional place among his other works, not only in terms of treating the issue independently, but also in terms of his approach to it. In this sense, he seems to consider the conception-assent division more as a problem of epistemology and does not address its consequences for the discipline of logic. When we evaluate his discussions in this work as a whole, we can assert that in terms of the discipline of logic, the question of what the result of this division actually is can be responded to in two ways.
The first is that logic is more concerned with the problem of coherence than with the question of truth, for logic determines the conditions under which a definition or syllogism may correspond to reality. Yet according to its official definition in terms of its purpose, logic strives to protect the mind from error during the process of thinking, which first involves establishing the correct relations between concepts, and second, the relation of necessity between premises and conclusions. Each of these is truth in terms of coherence, because truth, in this sense, requires only assent to the form and not to the definition and the propositions. In other words, the mistake that logic protects us from is in terms of structure, and thus it has no relevance when it comes to assenting to any particular view.
The second, which is a collateral result of the first, is that since logical perfection does not require truth, the assent of a judgement cannot be claimed to be logical, even though it can be seen that its analysis is, in fact, logical in terms of the process of logical reasoning through which it is achieved. Assent is a condition related to the capacity of the means used by the soul or the intellect to reach its object. These means can be summarized as follows: the intellect's self-evident knowledge, experience in general, and a specific or general source of authority. For this reason, the certainty of something that cannot be accepted to be otherwise, and which is aimed at in the theory of logical demonstration, requires the object of assent to be known self-evidently or through its causes. Even if the causes of something are determined, one can abstain from assenting to something due to the effects of a source of general or specific authority. Therefore, assent is not a purpose that can be provided structurally through logic.
In this sense, with regards to syllogisms and in terms of the truth itself, no matter how perfect the syllogisms are built in terms of their structure, and no matter how persuasive they are, a person's logical capacity does not require the capacity of being able to determine that the truth is present. Nevertheless, the logical capacity, in the broad sense defined by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, contains within it the capacity to carry and display the power of conception.
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